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1Beamforming Optimization for Physical Layer
Security in MISO Wireless Networks
Zhichao Sheng, Hoang D. Tuan, Trung Q. Duong and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract—A wireless network of multiple transmitter-user
pairs overheard by an eavesdropper, where the transmitters are
equipped with multiple antennas while the users and eaves-
dropper are equipped with a single antenna, is considered.
At different levels of wireless channel knowledge, the problem
of interest is beamforming to optimize the users’ quality-of-
service (QoS) in terms of their secrecy throughputs or maximize
the network’s energy efficiency under users’ QoS. All these
problems are seen as very difficult optimization problems with
many nonconvex constraints and nonlinear equality constraints
in beamforming vectors. The paper develops path-following com-
putational procedures of low-complexity and rapid convergence
for the optimal beamforming solution. Their practicability is
demonstrated through numerical examples.
Index Terms—Multi-input single-output network, secure com-
munication, energy-efficient communication, beamforming, path-
following algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Securing information has emerged as one of the most critical
issues in wireless communication [1], [2]. The broadcast
nature of wireless transmissions implies that they can be
quite vulnerable to adversary, who attempts to intercept their
information delivery or overhear the confidential information
intended for their users [3], [4]. Physical layer security (PLS)
exploiting the physical properties of wireless channels [5], [6]
has been proposed to ensure the secrecy of data transmissions
to end-users of low complexity, for which encryption cannot be
used. PLS is based on information theoretic characterizations
of secrecy, under which the user secrecy throughput of a
wireless transmission overheard by eavesdroppers (EVs) is
determined as the difference between the user throughput and
EVs’ throughput [2], [7]. Transmit beamforming to improve
the user throughput while controlling the throughput of the
wiretapped signal at the EVs thus presents an effective way
for secrecy throughput enhancement. Beamforming design for
maximizing instantaneous secrecy throughput has been consid-
ered in [8]–[12] by semi-definite relaxation and randomization
with the known inefficiency [13]. This beamforming design
has been successfully addressed in [14], [15]. In regards to
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outage probability, several works such as [16]–[19] used the
Bernstein-type inequalities obtained in an unpublished work
[20]. We will show that the results based on such Bernstein-
type inequalities may be very conservative. Reference [21]
considered outage region characterization of given beamform-
ers under imperfect channel state information (CSI).
On the other hand, as energy efficiency (EE) became a
very serious concern in wireless communication [22], [23],
the secure energy efficiency (SEE), which is the ratio of the
secrecy throughput to the total network power consumption,
measured in terms of secrecy bits per Joule per Hertz is
also increasingly important in PLS [24], [25]. Exploiting the
perfect CSI, the SEE maximization in [26]–[28] is based
on costly beamformers, which completely cancel the multi-
user interference and wiretapped signal at the EVs. The
computational complexity of the SEE optimization algorithms
for single-user multi-input multi-output (MIMO)/single-input
single-output (SISO) communications in [29] and [30] is also
high as each iteration still involves a difficult nonconvex
optimization problem. Our previous work [31] considered SEE
optimization for a more general case of MIMO networks. SEE
optimization was also considered in [15] for the worst case of
uncertainties for users’ and EVs’ channels. There is no existing
work on SEE optimization with secrecy throughput in terms
of probability outage.
In this paper, we consider a network of multiple transmitter-
user pairs overheard by an eavesdropper (EV). As the trans-
mitters are assumed to be equipped with multiple antennas
while the users and EV are equipped with a single antennas,
the target is to design transmit beamformers to optimize either
the users’ quality-of-service (QoS) in terms of their secrecy
throughput or the network’s SEE under the users’ QoS. It
should be realized that these problems of beamforming design
are still widely open for research, so we consider them at
different levels of channel knowledge. The paper is structured
as follows. Section II is devoted to the problem statements.
Section III considers these problems under the perfect CSI of
the all concerned channels, where path-following algorithms
of low complexity are developed for their solution. In Section
IV, the perfect CSI of the channels between the transmitters
and user is assumed but only the distribution of the channels
between the transmitters and EV is assumed known. As such,
the EV’s throughput is not deterministically defined but is de-
fined through its probability outage, which leads to a nonlinear
equation in beamforming vectors and the EV’s throughput,
making the beamforming designs much more computationally
challenging. Under the same knowledge on the channels
between the transmitters and EV in Section IV, Section V
2also assumes that the channels between the transmitters and
users are uncertain with Gaussian distributed errors, under
which there is no known result on the probability outage of
the users’ throughput. Nevertheless, based on a new result
on outage probability obtained in Appendix I, both problems
of users’ QoS optimization and network’s SEE optimization
are successfully addressed. The simulation Section V shows
the efficiency of the path-following algorithms developed in
sections III-V. Conclusions are given in Section VI. Appendix
I provides a new result on both upper bound and lower bound
of the outage-aware user throughput. Appendix II shows the
conservativeness of some other results, which are based on
Bernstein type inequalities. Some fundamental deterministic
inequalities that are used in Sections III-V are given in
Appendix III.
Notation. The inner product between vectors x and y is de-
fined as 〈x, y〉 = xHy. Analogously, 〈X,Y 〉 = Trace(XHY )
for matrices X and Y . Optimization variables are boldfaced.
Also the notation
∑M
j 6=i refers to the summation taken over the
index set {1, . . . ,M} \ {i}. I is the identity matrix of appro-
priate dimension and CN (0, I) is the set of complex Gaussian
random variables of zero means and identity covariance.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENTS
Consider a communication network of M transmitter-user
pairs overheard by an EV. Each transmitter is equipped with
Nt transmit antennas while the users and EV are equipped
by a single antenna. Thus, without the EV, the network looks
very much like that considered in [32]–[36], where the channel
knowledge is obtained from channel estimation, which is
implemented at a central processing unit of the network, while
beamforming is processed at a signal processing block of the
network. The information si for user i, which is normalized
as E(s2i ) = 1, is beamformed by wi ∈ CNt . The received
signal at user i is
yi = h
H
iiwisi +
M∑
j 6=i
hHjiwjsj + ni, (1)
where hji ∈ CNt is the vector channel from transmitter j to
user i and ni is the background noise with power σ2i .
Analogously, the received signal at the EV is
yE =
M∑
i=1
hHiewisi + ne, (2)
where hie ∈ CNt is the vector channel from transmitter i to
the EV and ne is the background noise with power σ2e .
For w , [wi]i=1,...,M , suppose that fi(w) is the throughput
user i while gi(w) is the wiretapped throughput for user i at
the EV. Our interest is the following optimization problems.
• Secrecy throughput maximin optimization under trans-
mitters’ power constraints:
max
w
Φ(w) , min
i=1,...,M
[
fi(w)− gi(w)
]
s.t. (3a)
||wi||2 ≤ Pi, i = 1, . . . ,M, (3b)
with Pi given to set the limit of transmission power at
transmitter i.
• Energy efficiency maximization over the secrecy through-
put threshold constraints:
max
w
Θ(w) ,
[
M∑
i=1
[fi(w)− gi(w)]
]
/pi(w)
s.t. (3b), (4a)
fi(w)− gi(w) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M, (4b)
with ci given to set the QoS threshold for user i and the
total network power consumption pi(w) , ζ
M∑
i=1
||wi||2+
Pc in transmitting wisi, where 0 < ζ < 1 is the the
reciprocal of the drain efficiency of the power amplifier
and Pc =
∑M
i=1 P
i
c with circuit power P
i
c at transmitter
i.
III. INSTANTANEOUS SECRECY THROUGHPUT
OPTIMIZATION
When the perfect CSI of all channels is available at the
transmitters, the user i’ instantaneous throughput is defined
by
fi(w) , ln
(
1 +
|hHiiwi|2∑
j 6=i |hHjiwj |2 + σ2i
)
, (5)
while the instantaneous wiretapped throughput for user i at
the EV is defined by
gi(w) , ln
(
1 +
|hHiewi|2∑
j 6=i |hHjewj |2 + σ2e
)
. (6)
For fi(w) and gi(w) defined by (5) and (6), problem (3) is
a particular case of the multi-cell beamforming design that
considered in [14], [15]. We now propose a more efficient
computation tailored for (3).
Let w(κ) be a feasible point for (3) found from (κ − 1)th
iteration. Applying inequality (69) in the Appendix II for x =
1/|hHiiwi|2, y =
∑M
j 6=i |hHjiwj |2 + σ2i , and x¯ = 1/|hHiiw(κ)i |2,
y¯ =
∑M
j 6=i |hHjiw(κ)j |2 + σ2i yields
fi(w) ≥ f (κ)i (w) (7)
for
f
(κ)
i (w) ,
ln(1 + x
(κ)
i )
+
x
(κ)
i
1 + x
(κ)
i
(
2− |h
H
iiw
(κ)
i |2
2<{(w(κ)i )HhiihHiiwi} − |hHiiw(κ)i |2
−
∑M
j 6=i |hHjiwj |2 + σ2i∑M
j 6=i |hHjiw(κ)j |2 + σ2i
)
, (8)
over the trust region
2<
{
(w
(κ)
i )
Hhiih
H
iiwi
}
− |hHiiw(κ)i |2 > 0, (9)
i = 1, . . . ,M,
where
x
(κ)
i =
|hHiiw(κ)i |2∑M
j 6=i |hHjiw(κ)j |2 + σ2i
.
3On the other hand, applying inequality (70) in the Appendix
II for x = |hHiewi|2, y =
∑M
j 6=i |hHjewj |2+σ2e and x¯ =
|hHiew(κ)i |2, y¯ =
∑M
j 6=i |hHjew(κ)j |2+σ2e yields
gi(w) ≤ g(κ)i (w), (10)
for
g
(κ)
i (w) ,
ln(1 + x
(κ)
e,i ) +
1
1 + x
(κ)
e,i
×
(
|hHiewi|2∑M
j 6=i(2<{(w(κ)j )HhjehHjewj} − |hHjew(κ)j |2) + σ2e
−x(κ)e,i
)
, (11)
over the trust region
M∑
j 6=i
(
2<{(w(κ)j )HhjehHjewj} − |hHjew(κ)j |2
)
> 0,
i = 1, . . . ,M, (12)
where
x
(κ)
e,i = |hHiew(κ)i |2/(
M∑
j 6=i
|hHjew(κ)j |2 + σ2e).
At the κ-th iteration we solve the following convex optimiza-
tion problem to generate the next feasible point w(κ+1):
max
w
Φ(κ)(w) , min
i=1,...,M
[
f
(κ)
i (w)− g(κ)i (w)
]
s.t. (3b), (9), (12). (13)
The computational complexity of (13) is
O(n2m2.5 +m3.5), (14)
where n = MNt is the number of scalar variables, and m =
3M is the number of constraints.
From (7) and (10), it can be easily checked that Φ(w) ≥
Φ(κ)(w) ∀ w and Φ(w(κ)) = Φ(κ)(w(κ)). On the other hand,
Φ(κ)(w(κ+1)) > Φ(κ)(w(κ)) as far as w(κ+1) 6= w(κ) because
the former is the optimal solution of (13) while the latter is
a feasible point for (13). We thus have the following chain of
inequalities and equalities:
Φ(w(κ+1)) ≥ Φ(κ)(w(κ+1)) > Φ(κ)(w(κ)) = Φ(w(κ)),
which implies that w(κ+1) is a better feasible point than
w(κ) for the nonconvex optimization problem (3). Using a
similar convergence argument as [37], we can show that at
least the sequence {w(κ)} converges to its locally optimal
solution. As such, the proposed Algorithm 1 a path-following
computational procedure for (11).
Next, we address the EE maximization (4). A direct ap-
proach (see e.g. [15]) is based on a lower bounding approx-
imation for the objective function in (4a). We now propose
another approach, which uses the above approximation for
the numerator of the objective function only, so the EE
Algorithm 1 Path-following algorithm for maximin instanta-
neous secrecy throughput optimization
Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point
w(0) for the convex constraints (3b). Calculate R(0)min as the
value of the objective in (3) at w(0). Set κ = 0.
repeat
• Solve the convex optimization problem (13) to obtain
the solution w(κ+1).
• Calculate R(κ+1)min as the value of the objective in (3) at
w(κ+1).
• Reset κ+ 1→ κ.
until R
(κ+1)
min −R(κ)min)
R
(κ)
min
≤ tol.
maximization problem (4) is indeed not more computationally
difficult than the throughput optimization problem (3).
As before, let w(κ) be its feasible point found from (κ−1)th
iteration. At the κ-th iteration, we solve the following con-
vex optimization problem to generate the next feasible point
w(κ+1):
max
w
M∑
i=1
[
f
(κ)
i (w)− g(κ)i (w)
]
−Θ(w(κ))pi(w)
s.t. (3b), (9), (12),
f
(κ)
i (w)− g(κ)i (w) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M. (15)
Note that w(κ) is a feasible point for (15), under which
M∑
i=1
[
f
(κ)
i (w
(κ))− g(κ)i (w(κ))
]
−Θ(w(κ))pi(w(κ)) = 0.
Therefore, as far as w(κ+1) 6= w(κ), the optimal solution
w(κ+1) of (15) must satisfy
M∑
i=1
[
f
(κ)
i (w
(κ+1))−g(κ)i (w(κ+1))
]
−Θ(w(κ))pi(w(κ+1)) > 0,
so
Θ(w(κ+1)) ,
M∑
i=1
[
fi(w
(κ+1))− gi(w(κ+1))
]
/pi(w(κ+1)) ≥
M∑
i=1
[
f
(κ)
i (w
(κ+1))− g(κ)i (w(κ+1))
]
/pi(w(κ+1)) >
Θ(w(κ)),
implying that w(κ+1) is a better feasible point than w(κ) for
the nonconvex optimization problem (4). As such, Algorithm
2, which is different from Algorithm 1 by solving the convex
optimization problem (15) at the κ-th iteration to generate the
next feasible point w(κ+1) instead of (13) in Algorithm 1, at
least converges to a locally optimal solution.
A feasible point w(0) for (4) in the initialization of Algorithm
2 is found by using Algorithm 1 in solving the problem
max
w
min
i=1,...,M
[
fi(w)− gi(wi)
]
/ci s.t. (3b). (16)
Namely Algorithm 1 will terminate whenever
mini=1,...,M
[
fi(w
(κ))− gi(w(κ))
]
/ci ≥ 1.
4Algorithm 2 Path-following algorithm for EE optimization
Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point
w(0) for (4). Set κ = 0.
repeat
• Solve the convex optimization problem (15) to obtain
the solution w(κ+1).
• Reset κ+ 1→ κ.
until Θ(w
(κ+1))−Θ(w(κ))
Θ(w(κ))
≤ tol.
IV. EV’S OUTAGE PROBABILITY MAXIMIZATION
When the EV is no longer part of the legitimate network, the
assumption on the perfect CSI for the wiretapped channels hje
at the transmitters made in the previous section is not practical.
Instead, it is common to assume that only the wiretapped
channel distribution [7]
hje =
√
h¯jeχj , χj ∈ CN (0, I), j = 1, . . . ,M (17)
is known, where
√
h¯je is a deterministic quantity which is
usually dependent on the distance from the transmitter j to the
EV. The user throughput fi(w) is still defined by (5) but the
wiretapped throughput gi(w) for user i at the EV is defined via
the following outage probability instead of the instantaneous
throughput defined by (6):
max
{
ln(1 + ri) : Prob
(
h¯ie|χHi wi|2∑M
j 6=i h¯je|χHj wj |2 + σ2e
< ri
)
< EV
}
(18)
for EV > 0. Note that |χHj wj |2 is an exponential distribution
with mean ||wj ||2. Therefore, by [38], this throughput is ln(1+
ri), where
gi,o(w, ri) = 0 (19)
for
gi,o(w, ri) , h¯ie ln(1− EV ) + σ2e
ri
||wi||2
+h¯ie
M∑
j 6=i
ln
(
1 +
rih¯je||wj ||2
h¯ie||wi||2
)
, (20)
which increases in ri with w held fixed.
Similarly to [38, Prop. 1] the problem of secrecy rate maximin
optimization (3) is equivalently formulated by
max
w,r
min
i=1,...,M
[
ln(1 +
|hHiiwi|2∑
j 6=i |hHjiwj |2 + σ2i
)
− ln(1 + ri)
]
s.t (3b), (21a)
gi,o(w, ri) ≥ 0, i = 1, ...,M, (21b)
ri > 0, (21c)
where the nonlinear equality constraint in (19) has been
replaced by the nonconvex constraint (21b).
The main difficulty is to develop a lower bounding ap-
proximation for the function gi,o(w, ri) at a feasible point
(w(κ), r(κ)) for (21), which is found from (κ − 1)th it-
eration. Applying inequality (69) for x = 1/rih¯je||wj ||2,
y = h¯ie||wi||2, and x¯ = 1/r(κ)i h¯je||w(κ)j ||2, y¯ = h¯ie||w(κ)i ||2
yields
ln
(
1 +
rih¯je||wj ||2
h¯ie||wi||2
)
≥ λ(κ)ij (ri,wj ,wi) (22)
over the trust region
2<
{
(w
(κ)
j )
Hwj
}
− ||w(κ)j ||2 > 0 (23)
for
λ
(κ)
ij (ri,wj ,wi) ,
ln(1 + x
(κ)
ij )
+y
(κ)
ij
(
2− r
(κ)
i h¯je||w(κ)j ||2
rih¯je(2<{(w(κ)j )Hwj} − ||w(κ)j ||2)
− h¯ie||wi||
2
h¯ie||w(κ)i ||2
)
=
ln(1 + x
(κ)
ij )
+y
(κ)
ij
(
2− r
(κ)
i ||w(κ)j ||2
ri(2<{(w(κ)j )Hwj} − ||w(κ)j ||2)
− ||wi||
2
||w(κ)i ||2
)
(24)
and x(κ)ij , r
(κ)
i h¯je||w(κ)j ||2/h¯ie||w(κ)i ||2 and y(κ)ij ,
x
(κ)
ij /(x
(κ)
ij + 1).
Furthermore, applying inequality (72) in the Appendix
yields
ri
||wi||2 ≥ β
(κ)
i (ri,wi) (25)
where
β
(κ)
i (ri,wi) , 2
√
r
(κ)
i
||w(κ)i ||2
√
ri − r
(κ)
i
||w(κ)i ||4
||wi||2, (26)
which is a concave function.
Based on (22) and (25) we obtain
gi,o(w, ri) ≥ g(κ)i,o (w, ri) (27)
for
g
(κ)
i,o (w, ri) , h¯ie ln(1− EV ) + σ2eβ(κ)i (ri,wi)
+h¯ie
M∑
j 6=i
λ
(κ)
ij (ri,wj ,wi), (28)
which is a concave function satisfying
gi,o(w
(κ), r
(κ)
i ) = g
(κ)
i,o (w
(κ), r
(κ)
i ).
Also, following [38], the second term in the objective (21a) is
upper bounded by the linear function
a
(κ)
i (ri) = ln(1 + r
(κ)
i )−
r
(κ)
i
r
(κ)
i + 1
+
ri
r
(κ)
i + 1
, (29)
5while the first term in (21a) is lower bounded by f (κ)i (w)
defined by (8) over the trust region (9).
We solve the following convex program at the κ-th iteration
to generate the next feasible point (w(κ+1), r(κ+1)u ):
max
w,r
min
i=1,...,M
[
f
(κ)
i (w)− a(κ)i (ri)
]
s.t (3b), (9), (21c), (23), (30a)
g
(κ)
i,o (w, ri) ≥ 0, i = 1, ...,M. (30b)
The computational complexity of (30) is (14) for n = MNt+
M and m = 5M .
Then, r(κ+1)i is found from solving the nonlinear equation
ψi(ri) , gi,o(w(κ), ri) = 0, i = 1, ...,M (31)
by bisection on [0, r(κ+1)u,i ] with tolerance b such that
0 ≤ ψi(r(κ+1)i ) ≤ b. (32)
A bisection on [rl, ru] for solving ψi(ri) = 0 where ψi
increases in ri > 0 is implemented as follows:
• Define ri = (rl + ru)/2. Reset rl = ri if ψi(ri) < 0.
Otherwise reset ru = ri.
• Terminate until 0 ≤ ψi(ri) ≤ b.
Like Algorithm 1, Algorithm 3 at least converges to a locally
optimal solution of (21).
Algorithm 3 Path-following algorithm for maximin secrecy
throughput optimization
Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point
(w(0), r(0)) for (21) and calculate R(0)min as the value of the
objective function in (21) at (w(0), r(0)).
repeat
• Solve the convex optimization problem (30) to obtain
the solution (w(κ+1), r(κ+1)u ).
• Solve the nonlinear equations (31) to obtain the roots
r
(κ+1)
i .
• Calculate R(κ+1)min as the value of the objective function
in (21) at (w(κ+1), r(κ+1)).
• Reset κ+ 1→ κ.
until R
(κ+1)
min −R(κ)min)
R
(κ)
min
≤ tol.
Next, the SEE maximization problem (4) can be formulated
as
max
w,r
Θ(w, r) ,
M∑
i=1
[
ln(1 +
|hHiiwi|2∑
j 6=i |hHjiwj |2 + σ2i
)
− ln(1 + ri)
]
/pi(w) s.t (3b), (21b), (21c), (33a)
ln(1 +
|hHiiwi|2∑
j 6=i |hHjiwj |2 + σ2i
)− ln(1 + ri) ≥ ci, (33b)
i = 1, . . . ,M,
where like (3b), ci in (33b) set the QoS threshold for user i.
As such, (33) is addressed by the following iterations with
the convergence guaranteed.
• Initialization. Use Algorithm 3 to obtain a feasible point
(w(0), r(0)) and define
θ(0) ,
M∑
i=1
[
fi(w
(0))− ln(1 + r(0)i )
]
/pi(w(0)).
• κ-th iteration. Let (w(κ), r(κ)) be a feasible point found
from the (κ− 1)th iteration. Define
θ(κ) ,
M∑
i=1
[
fi(w
(κ))− ln(1 + r(κ)i )
]
/pi(w(κ))
and then solve the following convex optimization problem
to generate the next feasible point (w(κ+1), r(κ+1)u ):
max
w,r
M∑
i=1
[
f
(κ)
i (w)− a(κ)i (ri)
]
−Θ(w(κ), r(κ))pi(w)
s.t. (3b), (9), (21c), (23), (30b),
f
(κ)
i (w)− a(κ)i (ri) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . .M. (34)
Further, r(κ+1)i is found from solving (31).
V. ROBUST OPTIMIZATION TO COMPENSATE USERS’
OUTAGE PROBABILITY
Now assume that the wiretapped channel hje is in form
(17), so the wiretapped throughput gi(w) for user i at the EV
is defined via (18) but
hji = h¯ji + δχji (35)
for χji ∈ CN (0, I) and 0 < δ << 1. The term δχji thus
represents the channel error in channel state estimation. Then
the user i’s throughput fi(w) is implicitly defined through the
outage probability as
ϕi,o(w) ,
max
{
ln(1 + Ri) :
Prob
(
|h¯Hiiwi|2
δ|χHiiwi|2 +
∑M
j 6=i |(h¯ji + δχji)Hwj |2 + σ2i
< Ri
)
< 
}
(36)
for  > 0.
Note that [39]
|(h¯ji + δχji)Hwj |2 =
|((1− δ)h¯ji/(1− δ) + δχji)Hwj |2 ≤
(1− δ)−1|h¯jiwj |2 + δ|χHjiwj |2,
which implies
|h¯Hiiwi|2
δ|χHiiwi|2 +
∑M
j 6=i |(h¯ji + δχji)Hwj |2 + σ2i
≥
|h¯Hiiwi|2
(1− δ)−1∑Mj 6=i |h¯Hjiwj |2 + δ∑Mj=1 |χHjiwj |2 + σ2i .
6Consequently,
Prob
(
|h¯Hiiwi|2
δ|χHiiwi|2 +
M∑
j 6=i
|(h¯ji + δχji)Hwj |2 + σ2i
< Ri
)
≤
Prob
(
|h¯Hiiwi|2
(1− δ)−1
M∑
j 6=i
|h¯Hjiwj |2 + δ
M∑
j=1
|χHjiwj |2 + σ2i
< Ri
)
(37)
Proposition 1: It is true that
ϕi,o(w) ≥
ϕ¯i,o(w) ,
max
{
ln(1 + Ri) :
Prob
(
|h¯Hiiwi|2
(1− δ)−1
M∑
j 6=i
|h¯Hjiwj |2 + δ
M∑
j=1
|χHjiwj |2 + σ2i
< Ri
)
< 
}
. (38)
Proof: By (37), if Ri > 0 such that
Prob
(
|h¯Hiiwi|2
(1− δ)−1
M∑
j 6=i
|h¯Hjiwj |2 + δ
M∑
j=1
|χHjiwj |2 + σ2i
< Ri
)
< 
then
Prob
(
|h¯Hiiwi|2
δ|χHiiwi|2 +
∑M
j 6=i |(h¯ji + δχji)Hwj |2 + σ2i
< Ri
)
< 
and (38) follows. 
Applying (64) in Appendix I for
a = |h¯Hiiwi|2, b = (1− δ)−1
M∑
j 6=i
|h¯Hjiwj |2 + σ2i
gives
ϕi,o(w) ≥
max
{
ln(1 + Ri) : δ
[
δM ||wmin||2
+
M − 1
2
||wmin||2 ln ϕi(w,Ri)||wmin||2
]
≤ ϕi(w,Ri)
}
, (39)
where
ϕi(w,Ri) ,
|h¯Hiiwi|2
Ri
−
(1− δ)−1 M∑
j 6=i
|h¯Hjiwj |2 + σ2i
 ,
0 < δM , −
(
ln − lnM + 1
M
M∑
i=1
ln Γ(i)
+M−12 ln δ
)
= ln −1 + lnM − 1M
M∑
i=1
ln Γ(i)
+M−12 ln δ
−1,
and
||wmin||2 = min
i=1,...,M
||wi||2.
Recall that Γ(i) are defined from (64).
Therefore, the problem of secrecy rate maximin optimiza-
tion (3) is formulated by
max
w,R,r
min
i=1,...,M
[
ln(1 + Ri)− ln(1 + ri)
]
s.t (3b), (21b), (21c), (40a)
ϕi(w,Ri) > 0, i = 1, . . . ,M, (40b)
δ
[
δM ||wmin||2 + M − 1
2
||wmin||2 ln ϕi(w,Ri)||wmin||2
]
≤ ϕi(w,Ri), i = 1, . . . ,M, (40c)
where ln(1 + Ri) − ln(1 + ri) in (40a) represents a lower
bound for the user i’s secrecy throughput.
Constraints (21b), (40b)-(40c) in (40) are nonconvex, which
need to be innerly approximated at each iteration. Let
(w(κ), R(κ), r(κ)) be a feasible point for (40) found from the
(κ− 1)th iteration. We have provided an inner approximation
for (21b) by (23) and (30b). Note that |h¯Hiiwi|2/Ri is a convex
function, so
|h¯Hiiwi|2/Ri ≥ `(κ)i (wi,Ri)
for
`
(κ)
i (wi,Ri) , 2<
{
(w
(κ)
i )
H h¯iih¯
H
iiwi
}
/R
(κ)
i
−Ri|h¯Hiiw(κ)i |2/(R(κ)i )2,
which is the linearization of |h¯Hiiwi|2/Ri at (w(κ)i , R(κ)i ).
Therefore, the nonconvex constraint (40b) is innerly approxi-
mated by the convex constraint
`
(κ)
i (wi,Ri) > (1− δ)−1
M∑
j 6=i
|h¯Hjiwj |2 + σ2i ,
i = 1, . . . ,M. (41)
Furthermore, for
x
(κ)
i ,
ϕi(w
(κ), R
(κ)
i )
||w(κ)min||2
it is true that
ln
ϕi(w,Ri)
||wmin||2 ≤ ln(x
(κ)
i )− 1 +
ϕi(w,Ri)
x
(κ)
i ||wmin||2
7that yields
||wmin||2 ln ϕi(w,Ri)||wmin||2 ≤
(
ln(x
(κ)
i )− 1
)
||wmin||2+ϕi(w,Ri)
x
(κ)
i
Constraint (40c) is thus innerly approximated by
δ
[
M − 1
2
(
ln(x
(κ)
i )− 1
)
+ δM
]
||wmin||2 ≤(
1− δ(M − 1)/2x(κ)i
)
ϕi(w,Ri), (42)
i = 1, . . . ,M.
Set
imin = arg min
i=1,...,M
||w(κ)i ||2,
i.e.
||w(κ)imin ||2 = mini=1,...,M ||w
(κ)
i ||2.
Verifying numerically that M−12
(
ln(x
(κ)
i )− 1
)
+δM ≥ 0 and
1− δ(M − 1)/2x(κ)i ≥ 0, we use
ϕi(w,Ri) ≥ ϕ(κ)i (w,Ri) (43)
, `(κ)i (wi,Ri)− (1− δ)−1
M∑
j 6=i
|h¯Hjiwj |2 − σ2i
in providing the following convex inner approximation of (42)
for each i = 1, . . . ,M :
δ
[
M − 1
2
(
ln(x
(κ)
i )− 1
)
+ δM
]
||wimin ||2 ≤(
1− δ(M − 1)/2x(κ)i
)
ϕ
(κ)
i (w,Ri), (44)
i = 1, . . . ,M.
Accordingly, the next feasible point (w(κ+1), R(κ+1)l , r
(κ+1)
u )
is generated at the κ-th iteration by the optimal solution of the
convex optimization problem
max
w,R,r
min
i=1,...,M
[
A
(κ)
i (Ri)− a(κ)i (ri)
]
s.t (3b), (21c), (23), (30b), (41), (44). (45)
The computational complexity of (45) is (14) for n = MNt+
2M and m = 7M .
At the same κ-th iteration, r(κ+1)i is found from solving (31)
by bisection on [0, r(κ+1)u,i ] such that (32), while R
(κ+1)
i is
found from solving
ζi(Ri) = 0 (46)
by bisection on a segment[
Rl,i, Ru,i
]
(47)
such that
−b ≤ ζi(R(κ+1)i ) ≤ 0. (48)
for
ζi(Ri) , −ϕi(w(κ+1),Ri) + δM − 1
2
||w(κ+1)min ||2
× ln ϕi(w
(κ+1),Ri)
||w(κ+1)min ||2
+ δδM ||w(κ+1)min ||2.(49)
Both Rl,i and Ru,i in (47) can be easily determined as follow.
If ζi(R
(κ+1)
l ) > 0 set Ru,i = R
(κ+1)
l and Rl,i = R
(κ+1)
l /ν
with the smallest integer ν such that ζi(R
(κ+1)
l /ν) < 0.
Otherwise, ζi(R
(κ+1)
l ) < 0 set Rl,i = R
(κ+1)
l and R
(κ+1)
u =
νR
(κ+1)
l with the smallest integer ν such that ζi(νR
(κ+1)
l ) >
0.
Algorithm 4 Path-following algorithm for maximin secrecy
throughput optimization
Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point
(w(0), R(0), r(0)) for (40) and calculate R(0)min as the value
of the objective function in (40) at (w(0), R(0), r(0)).
repeat
• Solve the convex optimization problem (45) to obtain
the solution (w(κ+1), R(κ+1)l , r
(κ+1)
u ).
• Solve the nonlinear equations (31) to obtain the roots
r
(κ)
i .
• Solve the nonlinear equations (46) for ζi(Ri) defined
by (49) to obtain the roots R(κ+1)i .
• Calculate R(κ+1)min as the value of the objective function
in (40) at (w(κ), R(κ+1), r(κ+1)).
• Reset κ+ 1→ κ.
until R
(κ+1)
min −R(κ+1)min )
R
(κ)
min
≤ tol.
An initial feasible (w(0), R(0), r(0)) can be easily found as
follows: taking w(0) and r(0) as the optimal solution of (21)
and R(0)i is found from solving −b ≤ ζi(Ri) ≤ 0 for
ζi(Ri) , −ϕi(w(0),Ri) + δM−12 ||w(0)min||2
× ln ϕi(w(0),Ri)||w(0)min||2 + δδM ||w
(0)
min||2
by bisection on [Rl,i, Ru,i]. Here
Ru,i =
|hHiew(0)i |2∑
j 6=i |hHjew(0)j |2 + σ2e
while Rl,i = Ru,i/ν with the smallest integer such that
ζi(Ru,i/n) < 0.
Next, we address the EE maximization (4) by the following
iterations with the convergence guaranteed.
• Initialization. Use Algorithm 4 to obtain a feasible point
(w(0), R(0), r(0)) and define
θ(0) ,
M∑
i=1
[
ln(1 +R
(0)
i )− ln(1 + r(0)i )
]
/pi(w(0)).
• κ-th iteration. Let (w(κ), R(κ), r(κ)) be a feasible point
found from the (κ− 1)th iteration. Define
θ(κ) ,
M∑
i=1
[
ln(1 +R
(κ)
i )− ln(1 + r(κ)i )
]
/pi(w(κ))
and then solve the following convex optimization
problem to generate the next feasible point
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Fig. 1. Minimal secrecy throughput among users versus the transmit power
limitation Pi with M = 2.
(w(κ+1), R
(κ+1)
l , r
(κ+1)
u ):
max
w,r
M∑
i=1
[
A
(κ)
i (Ri)− a(κ)i (ri)
]
− θ(κ)pi(w)
s.t. (3b), (21c), (23), (30b), (41), (44),
A
(κ)
i (Ri)− a(κ)i (ri) ≥ ci, i = 1, . . . ,M, (50)
Further, r(κ+1)i is found from solving (31), while R
(κ+1)
i
is found from solving (47) till satisfactory of (48) for
ζ(Ri) defined by (49).
VI. SIMULATION
This section presents numerical results to demonstrate the
efficiency of the proposed algorithms. Each transmitter is
equipped with Nt = 4 antennas. Scenarios of M ∈ {2, 5, 6}
pairs with the noise variance σ2i = σ
2
e = 1 mW are simulated
[40], [41]. All entries of channels hje and hie in (1) and (2) are
generated by independent and identically distributed complex
normal random variables of zero mean and unit variance. The
drain efficiency 1/ζ of power amplifier in (4) is 40% with the
circuit power of each transmit antenna Pa = 1.25 mW [30].
The computation tolerance for terminating all proposed Algo-
rithms is tol = 10−4. The obtained information throughput
results are divided by ln(2) for expressing secrecy throughputs
in bps/Hz and secure energy efficiencies in bits/J/Hz.
In the below discussion, the terms “Perfect CSI”, “EV out-
age”, and “User outage” correspond to the scenarios discussed
in Sections III, Section IV with the EV outage probability
EV ∈ {0.1, 0.6} in (18), and section V with the channel
error bound δ = 0.001 in (35) and user outage probability
 = 0.1 in (36), respectively.
A. Maximin secrecy throughput optimization
This subsection analyzes the impact of channel uncertainties
to the users’ achievable secrecy throughput. Figs. 1, 2 and
3 plot the users’ minimum secrecy throughput versus the
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transmit power limitation Pi varying from 10 mW to 50 mW
for M = 2, M = 5 and M = 6, respectively. Intuitively,
the secrecy throughput increases in the transmitted power
limitation Pi. In each case of M , both “EV outage” and
“User outage” with the small outage probability EV = 0.1
achieve better secrecy throughputs than “Perfect CSI”, but
the latter achieves better secrecy throughputs than the formers
with the large outage probability EV = 0.6. This outcome is
not surprised because the instantaneous wiretapped throughput
defined by (6) is actually higher than the throughput outage
defined by (18) at small outage probabilities EV . These
figures also show that the secrecy output performance is
deteriorated with the increased number of transmitter-user
pairs, which leads to a stronger inter-user interference hurting
the users’ throughput.
Table I provides the average number of iterations required to
solve the problem of maximin secrecy throughput optimization
9TABLE I
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS FOR MAXIMIN SECRECY THROUGHPUT OPTIMIZATION WITH M ∈ {2, 5, 6}.
Pi (mW) 10 20 30 40 50
Perfect CSI 9/12/13 8/15/17 10/16/16 9/18/19 8/18/20
EV outage (EV = 0.1) 5/12/14 7/15/17 6/17/17 7/18/18 6/17/20
User outage (EV = 0.1) 5/8/8 3/9/10 4/7/12 5/11/12 4/10/11
EV outage (EV = 0.6) 8/14/14 8/17/18 7/17/20 8/19/20 6/20/22
User outage (EV = 0.6) 6/9/7 6/12/12 3/11/10 4/12/15 4/13/14
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for the above three cases with M = 2, M = 5 and M = 6,
respectively. On average, the proposed algorithms converge in
less than 10, 20 and 22 iterations, for M = 2, M = 5 and
M = 6, respectively.
B. Secure energy efficiency maximization
This subsection examines the performance of the proposed
SEE maximization algorithms. The threshold ci in (4b) for
QoS is 2 bps/Hz, 1 bps/Hz and 0.6 bps/Hz for M = 2,
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M = 5 and M = 6, respectively. The transmit power
limitation Pi varies from 5 mW to 25 mW. Fig. 4 shows
that “EV outage” with the small outage probability EV =
0.1 significantly outperforms other cases. The corresponding
sum secrecy throughput and total transmit power plotted in
Figs. 5 and 6 particularly explain this. “EV outage” with
EV = 0.1 achieves higher sum secrecy throughput in Fig.
5 and consumes less power in Fig. 6. Furthermore, the SEE
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Fig. 8. Energy efficiency versus the transmit power limitation Pi with M =
6.
performances saturates when the transmit power limitation
exceeds the threshold 10 mW. In the region of small transmit
power limitation, the denominator of SEE is dominated by
the circuit power so the SEE is maximized by maximizing the
sum secrecy throughput in the numerator. However, in larger
regions of transmit power limitation, the denominator of SEE
becomes to be dominated by the actual transmit power, which
by Fig. 6 saturates after Pi = 10 mW, making the sum secrecy
throughput and SEE behave similarly in Figs. 4 and 5. Further,
by Fig. 7 and 8, SEE follows a similar pattern for M = 5 and
M = 6, respectively.
Lastly, the average number of iterations is provided by
Table II, which particularly shows that our proposed SEE
maximization algorithm on average converges in less than 16,
24 and 28 iterations for M = 2, M = 5 and M = 6, respectively.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
For a wireless network of multiple transmitter-user pairs
overhear by an eavesdropper, we have considered the beam-
forming design to maximize either the users’ secrecy through-
put or the network’s secure energy efficiency under QoS
constraints in terms of users’ secrecy throughput thresholds.
At different levels of channel knowledge, we have developed
path-following algorithms of low complexity but rapid con-
vergence for computation. The provided simulations have not
only shown the efficiency of the developed algorithms but also
linked the outage probability with the secrecy degree. Exten-
sions to multi-cell coordinated beamforming are underway.
APPENDIX I: OUTAGE PROBABILITY INEQUALITIES
We derive bounds for
Prob
 a
δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 + b
< r
 (51)
⇔ Prob
(
a/r − b < δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2
)
(52)
for a > 0, b > 0 and r > 0. Here χi ∈ CN (0, I) while wi
are deterministic complex vectors.
Note that
|〈χi,wi〉|2 = ||wi||2|〈χi,wi/||wi||〉|2 = ||wi||2pi
where pi is an exponential distribution with the unit mean.
As
a
δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 + b
<
a
b
the probability in (51) is not zero if and only if
r < a/b⇔ a/r − b > 0. (53)
For
||wmin||2 , min
i=1,...,M
||wi||2.
it follows that
Prob
(
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 < (a/r − b)/δ
)
=
Prob
(
M∑
i=1
||wi||2pi < (a/r − b)/δ
)
≤
Prob
(
M∑
i=1
||wmin||2pi < (a/r − b)/δ
)
=
Prob
(
M∑
i=1
pi < (a/r − b)/δ||wmin||2
)
=∫
M∑
i=1
ti <
a− rb
δ||wmin||2
M∏
i=1
e−tidt1 · · · dtM .
Using the representation
u(x) =
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
ex(ω + β)
ω + β
dω
for the unit step function [42] leads to∫
M∑
i=1
ti <
a− rb
δ||wmin||2
M∏
i=1
e−tidt1 · · · dtM =
1
2pi
∫ ∞
0
· · ·
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
e
[
a/r − b
δ||wmin||2 −
M∑
i=1
ti
]
(ω + β)
ω + β
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TABLE II
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS FOR SECURE ENERGY EFFICIENCY MAXIMIZATION WITH M ∈ {2, 5, 6}.
Pi (mW) 5 10 15 20 25
Perfect CSI 10/14/19 13/18/23 14/20/25 14/21/27 15/22/28
EV outage (EV = 0.1) 10/14/16 12/17/21 12/18/21 13/19/22 14/19/22
User outage (EV = 0.1) 3/7/9 4/7/9 5/9/10 3/8/9 6/10/11
EV outage (EV = 0.6) 11/16/18 13/19/23 15/22/25 16/24/26 16/23/28
User outage (EV = 0.6) 5/8/11 7/8/11 4/9/10 6/10/12 5/10/12
×
(
M∏
i=1
e−tidti
)
dω =
1
2pi
∫ ∞
0
· · ·
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
M∏
i=1
e−ti(1 + ω + β)dt1 . . . dtM
×e
(ω + β)
a/r − b
δ||wmin||2
ω + β
dω =
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
1
(1 + ω + β)M
e
(ω + β)
a/r − b
δ||wmin||2
ω + β
dω =
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
[
1
ω + β
−
M∑
i=1
1
(1 + ω + β)i
]
×e
(ω + β)
a/r − b
δ||wmin||2 dω, (54)
where for the last equality we have used
1
x(1 + x)M
=
1
x
−
M∑
i=1
1
(1 + x)i
, (55)
which can be proved by mathematical induction. Indeed, it is
obvious that
1
x(1 + x)
=
1
x
− 1
1 + x
,
i.e. (55) holds true for M = 1. Suppose that (55) is true for
M = n, i.e.
1
x(1 + x)n
=
1
x
−
n∑
i=1
1
(1 + x)i
.
Then
1
x
−
n+1∑
i=1
1
(1 + x)i
= (
1
x
−
n∑
i=1
1
(1 + x)i
)− 1
(1 + x)n+1
=
1
x(1 + x)n
− 1
(1 + x)n+1
=
1
x(1 + x)n+1
,
i.e. (55) is true for M = n+ 1, completing the proof for (55).
Furthermore, by [42, (28)-(29)]
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
ex(ω + β)
ω + β
dω = 1 for x > 0,
1
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
ex(ω + β)
(1 + ω + β)i
dω =
e−xxi−1
Γ(i)
for x > 0,
where Γ(i) ,
∫∞
0
ti−1/etdt, for which Γ(1) = Γ(2) = 1,
Γ(3) = 2, Γ(4) = 6, Γ(5) = 24.
We thus obtain
Prob
(
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 < (a/r − b)/δ
)
≤
1− e−(a/r−b)/δ||wmin||2
M∑
i=1
(a/r − b)i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmin||2)i−1
, (56)
or
Prob
(
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 ≥ (a/r − b)/δ
)
=
1− Prob
(
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 < (a/r − b)/δ
)
≥
1−
[
1− e−(a/r−b)/δ||wmin||2
M∑
i=1
(a/r − b)i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmin||2)i−1
]
=
e−(a/r−b)/δ||wmin||
2
M∑
i=1
(a/r − b)i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmin||2)i−1
. (57)
Analogously,
Prob
(
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 < (a/r − b)/δ
)
≥
1− e−(a/r − b)/δ||wmax||2
M∑
i=1
(a/r − b)i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmax||2)i−1 , (58)
for
||wmax||2 , max
i=1,...,M
||wi||2.
Therefore, we arrive at the following result.
Theorem 1: The following two-sided inequalities hold true:
e−(a/r − b)/δ||wmin||2
M∑
i=1
(a/r − b)i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmin||2)i−1
≤ (59)
Prob
(
a/r − b < δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2
)
=
Prob
 a
δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 + b
≤ r
 ≤
e−(a/r − b)/δ||wmax||2
M∑
i=1
(a/r − b))i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmax||2)i−1 . (60)
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Now, by Cauchy inequality
M∑
i=1
(a/r − b)i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmin||2)i−1
≥
M
(∏M
i=1
(a/r−b)i−1
Γ(i)(δ||wmin||2)i−1
)1/M
=
M
(
∏M
i=1 Γ(i))
1/M
(
(a/r−b)
δ||wmin||2
)(M−1)/2
.
Therefore, it follows from (59) that
e−(a/r−b)/δ||wmin||
2 M
(
∏M
i=1 Γ(i))
1/M
×
(
(a/r − b)
δ||wmin||2
)(M−1)/2
≤
Prob
 a
δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 + b
≤ r
 . (61)
Then
max
{
r : Prob
 a
δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 + b
≤ r

≤ 
}
≥
max
{
r : e−(a/r−b)/δ||wmin||
2 M
(
∏M
i=1 Γ(i))
1/M
× ( (a/r − b)
δ||wmin||2
)(M−1)/2
≤ 
}
= (62)
max
{
r : − a/r − b
δ||wmin||2
+(lnM − 1
M
M∑
i=1
ln Γ(i))
+
M − 1
2
(ln(a/r − b) − ln δ − ln ||wmin||2
)
≤ ln 
}
= (63)
max
{
r : − a/r − b||wmin||2 + δ(lnM
− 1
M
M∑
i=1
ln Γ(i)) + δ
M − 1
2
(ln(a/r − b)
− ln δ − ln ||wmin||2
) ≤ δ ln } =
max
{
r : − a/r − b||wmin||2 + δ
M − 1
2
× (ln(a/r − b)− ln ||wmin||2) ≤ δ( ln − lnM
+
1
M
M∑
i=1
ln Γ(i) +
M − 1
2
ln δ
)}
. (64)
Note that for M = 1 it follows from (59) and (60) that
Prob
(
a
|〈χ,w〉|2 + b < r
)
= e−(a/r−b)/||w||
2
,
which is a known result since |〈χ,w〉|2 is an exponential
distribution with mean ||w||2:
Prob
(
a
|〈χ,w〉|2 + b < r
)
= Prob
(
a/r − b < 〈χ,w〉|2)
=
∫ ∞
a/r−b
e−t/||w||2/||w||2dt
= e−(a/r−b)/||w||
2
.
Particularly,
max
{
r : Prob
(
a
δ|〈χ,w〉|2 + b < r
)
≤

}
=
a
b+ δ||w||2 ln −1 . (65)
APPENDIX II: BERNSTEIN-TYPE INEQUALITY AND ITS
CONSERVATIVENESS
There is an approach, which is based on the following
Bernstein-type inequality [20] of rough estimation.
Theorem 2: [20, Lemma 0.2] Suppose that A is a sym-
metric matrix and z is Gaussian with zero mean and identity
covariance. Then
Prob
(
zHAz ≥ trace(A) + 2||A||√x+ 2λ+max(A)x
) ≤
exp(−x), (66)
where λ+max(A) = max{λmax, 0}.
One can use inequality (66) for an inner approximation of the
set
R(a, b) ,
{
r : Prob
(
δ
M∑
i=1
|〈χi,wi〉|2 > a
r
− b
)
≤ 
}
.
(67)
By setting z = [χTi ]
T
i=1,...,M and
A = diag[wiwHi ]i=1,...,M
we have
∑M
i=1 |〈χi,wi〉|2 = zHAz and trace(A) =∑M
i=1 ||wi||2, and
λmax(A) = max
i=1,...,M
[||wi||2] and ||A|| =
√√√√ M∑
i=1
||wi||4.
According to (66)
Prob
(
zHAz ≥ trace(A) + 2||A||
√
ln −1
+2λmax(A) ln 
−1
)
≤ .
Therefore, r ∈ R(a, b) if
(
a
r
− b)/δ ≥ trace(A) + 2||A||
√
ln −1
+2λmax(A) ln 
−1
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⇔ (a
r
− b)/δ ≥
M∑
i=1
||wi||2 + 2
√√√√ M∑
i=1
||wi||4
√
ln −1
+2 max
i=1,...,M
[||wi||2] ln −1
⇔ r ≤ a/
b+ δ
 M∑
i=1
||wi||2 + 2
√√√√ M∑
i=1
||wi||4
√
ln −1
+2 max
i=1,...,M
[||wi||2] ln −1
)]
(68)
which is too conservative compared with (64). For instance,
for M = 1, (68) means
r = a/(b+ δ||w||2(1 + 2
√
ln −1 + 2 ln −1))
which is very conservative compared with (65).
APPENDIX III: BASIC DETERMINISTIC INEQUALITIES
For every x > 0, y > 0, x¯ > 0 and y¯ > 0,
ln(1 + 1/xy) ≥
ln(1 + 1/x¯y¯) +
1/x¯y¯
1 + 1/x¯y¯
(2− x/x¯− y/y¯), (69)
which follows from the convexity of function ln(1 + 1/xy) in
the domain {x > 0, y > 0}. Furthermore,
ln(1 + x/y) ≤ ln(1 + x¯/y¯) + 1
1 + x¯/y¯
(x/y − x¯/y¯), (70)
which follows from the concavity of function ln(1 + z) in the
domain {z > 0}. Lastly, based on the inequality
x2/t ≥ 2(x¯/t¯)x− (x¯2/t¯2)t ∀ x > 0, x¯ > 0, t > 0, t¯ > 0
(71)
that follows from the convexity of x2/t, we have the following
inequality
r
||w||2 ≥ 2(
√
r¯/||w¯||2)√r − (r¯/||w¯||4)||w||2 (72)
∀ r > 0, r¯ > 0,w ∈ CN , w¯ ∈ CN .
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